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This paper investigates Thucydides’ instruction on the problematic concept of the democratic 
empire. Although the term “democratic empire,” that is, the combination of democracy and empire, is 
often justified in the modern context, it appeared to the ancient to be very problematic because of its 
inherent contradiction. The paper examines how Thucydides dealt with the Athenian Empire as an 
exemplary case of democratic empire. More specifically it examines how Thucydides related the rise 
and fall of the Athenian Empire to its characteristics of democratic empire. Many scholars attributed 
the collapse of the Empire to the excessive desire of the demos. I do not deny this traditional reading. 
Yet I argue that the Athenian demos was fully aware of what it was doing: it preferred democracy to 
empire when it had to choose either. By reading closely Thucydides I try to show how the Athenian 
demos constantly maintained democracy even when its preference for democracy could endanger its 
empire. Based on this reading of Thucydides, I conclude that Thucydides instructs both democratic 
citizens and imperialist elites that they cannot maintain democratic empire in the long run: they should 
choose democracy or imperialism at a certain point. 
 
Keywords: Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, Athenian Empire, Athenian Democracy, 





The term “democratic empire” seems to contain two incompatible words at least in 
normative sense: “democracy,” which connotes praiseworthy goal of domestic politics, and 
“empire,” which connotes morally despicable attitude toward outside. However, the negative 
aspect of empire was often justified in the name of progress and even liberty in the modern 
era.1 In the twentieth century, moreover, imperial position embraced ideal of democracy 
actively and vice versa. For example, the United States in the cold war period proudly upheld 
the position of the democratic empire by playing the role of the hegemon of democratic 
states and claiming to be their protector from communist-authoritarian power.2 In the post-
                                                          
∗ This work was supported by the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government 
(MOEHRD, Basic Research Promotion Fund) (KRF-2006-332-B00007). An earlier version of this 
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1 For example, liberal and progressive thinkers such as Bentham and both the Mills justify the empire 
as a legitimate form of governance in maintaining modern civilization. However, it is an exaggeration 
to say that all 19th-century liberalists were straightforward imperialists. For the different tenors of 
relating liberalism and imperialism, see Sullivan (1983). For a broader critique of modern liberalism’s 
attraction of imperialism, see Mehta (1999). For connection of empire and liberty in the context of 
republicanism see Armitage (2002). 
2 During the Cold War, the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was often compared 
to that between Athens and Sparta. In the post-Cold War period, the study of Athenian imperialism 
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Cold War world, the United States took another form of democratic empire by intervening in 
the domestic affairs of other sovereign states in the name of “exporting democracy” or 
“humanitarian intervention.” After the 9/11 catastrophe, the Bush administration applied the 
term “empire” outspokenly to American foreign policies, with the pretext of nation-building 
in “failed” states.3 
The contemporary acceptance of the democratic empire is based on the assumption that 
the oppressive and invasive elements inherent in the term “empire” can be condoned only if 
the empire pursues democratic causes in either domestic or foreign policies. Yet, the more 
fundamental assumption is that it is possible for a state to adopt imperial policies in foreign 
affairs, while concurrently maintaining a liberal-democratic regime within domestic affairs. 
In contrast, the ancient Greeks — especially the intellectuals — never believed the way a 
city-state behaved toward other city-states could be separated from the way the pertinent 
city-state behaved toward its own citizens. For example, Plato related foreign policies not 
only to the ethos of the state but also to the formation of individual souls. He argued that the 
specific foreign policies of a city-state affect everything within its jurisdiction down to the 
internal lives of citizens. The opposite was also true: individual soul-formation had an 
irresistible influence on the major direction of foreign policies (ex. Plato’s Republic, Books 
2-4). While Plato revealed the relationship between individual souls and national character in 
a philosophical way, Thucydides recorded it by writing the history of the Peloponnesian War. 
Specifically, as we will see later, Thucydides argued that the Athenian Empire declined due 
to the excessive desires of the demos — that is, the soul-corruption of Athenian citizens 
(Thuc.2.65).4  
Thus, Thucydides draws our attention to the “forgotten” relationship between states’ 
foreign policies and individual soul-formation. How exactly was the latter related to the fate 
of the democratic empire? From a historical perspective, how was it possible that the 
democratic desires of the Athenian Empire were well moderated at the beginning but later 
unbridled, to the ruin of the empire? Many classical readers find the answers in Thucydides’ 
apparent statement that the leaders following Pericles were not able to keep in check 
unbridled democratic desires (Connor 1984; Cornford 1969; Euben 1986; Forde 1989; Orwin 
1984; Orwin 1994). This explanation, however, does not offer the exact mechanism by 
which the Athenian Empire was connected to its democratic demos. Moreover, I argue that 
focusing merely on the absence of Pericles does not guide us properly to Thucydides’ deeper 
and eternal instruction, because then the only solution to the fate of the democratic empire 
seems to be to wait for another virtuous leader.  
Contrary to traditional readings, my reading of Thucydides is based on the assumption 
that the Athenian demos was well aware of the fate of the democratic empire. Thus, this 
paper will examine how the Athenians dealt with their problematic empire. The first point of 
the paper is that the doomed fate of the democratic empire was anticipated, even at the 
beginning, primarily because it conceived two apparently irreconcilable principles. For a 
while, the inherent contradiction of the democratic empire was concealed, justified, and even 
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subject see Bruell (1974: 11-17); Forde (1986: 433-48; 1989); Lebow (2001).  
3 For the theoretical critics of imperial nature of the US foreign policies especially under the influence 
of terrorism, see Hardt and Negri (2004); Elshtain (2003). 
4 Throughout the article I cite Thucydides according to the traditional division of book and chapter. All 
quotations are from Warner’s translation.  




praised by eloquent politicians, but never resolved. The rhetoric of the Athenian Empire 
worked at the beginning; however, as the Peloponnesian War waged on, the contradiction 
imploded to the effect of ruining the empire. 
The second point of the paper is related to reinterpreting Thucydides’ “eternal 
instruction” in light of a reevaluation of the demos’ role in the democratic empire. I do not 
completely deny the traditional reading, whereby the Athenian demos contributed to the 
downfall of its own empire; unlike the traditional reading, however, I emphasize more 
importantly that it did so consciously and even purposively. When the contradiction inherent 
in its “democratic empire” was no longer concealed and the demos faced a choice between 
democracy and empire, it displayed a clear preference for democracy. For example, when the 
demos chose Diodotus’ policy rather than Cleon’s in the Mytilenean debates, and when it 
recalled it was Alcibiades who was the most capable commander-in-chief in the Sicilian 
expedition, it applied a simple criterion: How democratic did they seem to be, when they 
spoke to the public? The demos did not care for the virtues by which the leaders may have 
contributed to the common good of the empire; instead, the Athenian demos paid close 
attention to the rhetoricians’ perceived democratic loyalty. The persistent and conscious 
purpose of the demos was to maintain democracy, even when it was aware that its preference 
for democracy could severely undermine its empire. If this point is correct, the Athenian 
demos could be reevaluated: it may be blamed for irresponsibility, but not for irrationality.   
In the following paper, I will examine critical junctures of Thucydides’ History — 
namely, Archaeology, Pentecontaetia, Pericles’ funeral oration, the Mytilenean debates, and 
the Sicilian expedition — to support the two aforementioned points. Let us begin to explain 
how the idea of a “democratic empire” came to light at the dawn of the Athenian Empire.  
 
 
2. THE “SHOTGUN MARRIAGE” OF EMPIRE AND DEMOCRACY: EMERGENCE 
OF THE DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE IN ARCHAEOLOGY AND PENTECONTAETIA 
 
In Archaeology and Pentecontaetia, Thucydides demonstrates the unique way by which 
Athens combined empire and democracy. He first explains how wars in the land of the 
Greeks were gradually interconnected with the concept of freedom (eleutheria), which in 
turn related to empire (arche) (Balot 2001; 2004; Riley 2000). To understand the process by 
which the Athenian democratic empire was born, it is useful to explore the Athenians’ 
specific conceptions of freedom and empire.5  
First of all, it is notable that the Greeks developed the concept of freedom in response to 
the threat of Persia. In the mainland Greece of the sixth century BCE, wars normally resulted 
from rivalries between neighboring communities over disputed borders. Such wars did not 
usually result in the destruction of cities or the enslavement of their populations (Raaflaub 
1994: 127). The military subjection of and subsequent rule over entire communities was 
                                                          
5 According to Balot, the Greek understood freedom by way of three central contrasts: 1. Freedom from 
external tyranny, empire: The Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor experienced “slavery.” They had 
long been subject to the authority and tributary demands of Eastern monarchs (Thuc.6.82). 2. The 
Greeks contrasted freedom with the ordinary Persians’ “enslavement” to their king and master. 3. 
Freedom was contrasted with the weakness and effeminacy of the Persians, since the Greeks 
considered freedom a “masculine” attribute. In summary, freedom required a certain element of ruling 
(Balot 2001). See also Hansen (1996), Raaflaub ( 2004). 
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virtually unknown; at most, early attempts at maintaining control over other city-states, 
based on personal power and relationships, were undertaken by some tyrants. Thus, the 
problem of communal independence was not yet a political concern (Connor 1984).6 It was 
not until the Persian Wars and their aftermaths that the Greeks saw their confrontation with 
external forces in terms of a struggle for freedom and against servitude.  
In the course of the Persian Wars, Athenians discerned the connection between internal 
freedom from tyrants and external freedom from Persian domination. Herodotus had a good 
sense of it; just before the battle at Marathon, he reports that the Athenian Miltiades had 
invoked the tyrannicides of the past (the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton), in order to 
encourage the polemarch, who was going to fight against Persia: “it is now in your hands, 
Callimachus, either to enslave Athens, or to make her free and to leave behind you for all 
future generations a monument more glorious than even Harmodius and Aristogeiton left” 
(Hdt.6.109). Miltiades here links explicitly internal freedom from tyranny to external 
freedom from Persian domination. Now that internal freedom — supposedly achieved by 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton — was easily identified with democracy, the Athenians took 
their struggle against Persia as not only a protection of freedom from external threat but also 
as the protection of democracy.  
The Athenians’ awareness of the connection of war and democracy was increased by 
observing the events of Asia Minor, where the failure of revolt from Persia resulted in 
servitude to both the Persians and tyrants. Persian rule in Asia Minor was exercised 
indirectly through tyrants who were members of the local aristocracy, and the Athenians 
were able to see clearly that the maintenance of their democracy required an adamant 
resistance to being ruled and, preferably, the capability to rule others (Balot 2004). In 
addition, the Athenians felt a self-imposed responsibility for the freedom of the whole of 
Greek society, and they eventually claimed that their selflessness and moral superiority 
entitled them not only to political and military leadership (hegemon), but to rule (arche) over 
other Greeks.  
It was true that after the Persian Wars, the Athenian leadership was largely granted by 
other Greeks. However, it was critically distinctive to become a hegemon and an empire 
(arche),7 because the latter was allowed to subjugate equals. The Pentacontaetia describes 
how Athens gradually transformed itself from an alliance (symmachia) into an empire 
(arche). Around 450 BCE, warfare with the Persians ceased and the league had fulfilled its 
original goal of liberating and protecting the Greeks from the Persian Empire. Since then, 
however, the process of transforming the Athenian position in the Greek world had begun. 
After the threat of the Persians ended in the middle of the century, the same generation of 
Athenians had become accustomed to their city’s hegemon and imperial role; one could 
observe that Athens now used force not only against those who refused to join, but against 
                                                          
6 For the pervasiveness of war in the Greek world, see Plato (Laws 626a2-5) where he says: “What 
most men call ‘peace’ is really only a fiction (onoma), and in cold fact all states are by nature (kata 
physin) fighting an undeclared war against every other state.” (cf. Xenophon also says: “War is like 
agriculture as being among those most necessary human activities that are carried out in the open air” 
(Memorabilia 2.1.6). I cite classical authors according to traditional convention by using Stephanus 
pages for Plato and Aristotle, and division of books, chapters and lines for other authors.   
7 The Greek term arche (rule, empire) represents the first extensive and long-term rule of one city-state 
(polis) over other city-states (poleis), despite the modern connotations of these terms (Raaflaub 1996: 
274-5).  




other city-states intent on leaving the league. Thucydides branded the subjugation of Naxos 
(in the mid-460s BCE) as the first “enslavement” of a formerly autonomous city-state.8 
What should be noted here is that the dominance of Athens became so marked that it was 
recognized, and finally also designated, as being rule (arche) or even oppression (turannis) 
rather than hegemony (i.e., leadership). Athens appeared to be a tyrant-city (polis turannos) 
in the Greek world. “Tyranny” was originally a term used only within a city-state or 
community to designate the extraordinary power of an individual over his fellow citizens, 
who were otherwise entitled to enjoy equality before laws (isonomia) and equal say 
(isegoria). Just like a tyrant within a polis, Athens ignored the initial spirit of equality and 
autonomy among its allies; hence, Athens was considered a tyrant-city and its former allies 
its slaves (douloi), which prompted widespread resentment and dissatisfaction (Thuc. 1.99.1–
3). Appearing to be a tyrant-city, Athens faced numerous problems pertaining to focusing on 
Athenian methods and policies in running an empire. For the first time in the Greek world, 
the necessity emerged of justifying its domination and of developing rhetoric for power and 
rule over others.9 They needed to be reassured that it was deserved, necessary, and good. 
On the surface, an empire for freedom as an ideal or a democratic empire in reality 
appeared to be natural products in achieving internal and external freedom at the same time. 
However, we should remember that inasmuch as any empire has been defined in terms of 
tyrannical rule — and democracy in terms of freedom from tyranny — the combination of 
these two opposing principles is revealingly unnatural. Perhaps non-Athenians were in a 
better position to perceive the inherent contradiction of a “democratic empire,” because they 
forfeited their freedom by being subject to this empire. Herodotus already had raised the 
warning that Athens’ internal health and external strength would transform the leading Greek 
city into a quasi-tyrannical imperial power comparable to Persia itself (Balot 2004). However, 
it took some time for the Athenians to be awakened to the contradiction embedded in the 
concept of a democratic empire; Pericles, an excellent Athenian rhetorician, contributed to 
the duration of Athenians’ blindness to that contradiction. In the next section, we will see 
how Pericles enchanted the Athenians, so that they believed that their democracy matched 




3. DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE ENCHANTED: THE SPEECH OF ATHENIAN ENVOYS 
AT THE SPARTAN CONGRESS AND IN PERICLES’ FUNERAL ORATION 
 
At the Spartan Congress, the Athenian envoys first justified their empire by resorting to 
the necessity or compulsion (anagke) thesis, that they were “compelled” to take the empire. 
The compulsion thesis was supplemented by the famous Athenian thesis that explained the 
                                                          
8 Similarly, Russell Meiggs describes that of Thasos as the first unambiguous sign of tyranny (Meiggs 
1972: 86). About Naxos see Thuc.1.98 where Thucydides uses the term enslavement (edoulothe). 
With regard to the enslavement of Thasos, see Thuc.1.100.  
9 The rhetoric of the fourth century BCE panegyric speeches suggests that the Athenian demos felt a 
deep and constant need for legitimization of the empire. The Athenians discussed the forms, goals, 
and consequences of their exercises of such rule (de Romilly 1963: 60ff; Meyer 1967: 147ff). The 
Mytilenean debates offer a good example (Thuc.3.36–48), while Euphemus’ speech in Camarina 
illustrates the need to justify imperial rule abroad (Thuc.5.84). 
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three well-known motives of the empire: fear, honor, and profit (Thuc.1.75).10 When Sparta 
was no longer willing to stand with the Athenians, Athens was compelled to overtake it, for 
fear of Persian invasions. Once the empire was taken up, the Athenian envoys insisted, they 
had to hold on to their rule in order to preserve their own safety and freedom, because of the 
hatred of their subjects and Sparta’s hostility. As a result, Athens now feared not only the 
Persians but also its allies (Thcu.1.75). Fear was the first motivation of the Athenian Empire; 
however, the Athenian envoys continued with the compulsion thesis by arguing that honor 
and profit as well as fear were equally irresistible and extenuating compulsions on which 
their empire rested (Forde 1995: 147).11 According to this thesis, there was no other choice 
for the Athenians (Thuc.1.76).12 In other words, the Athenians appealed to universal human 
nature in justifying the acquisition of the empire (Forde 1986: 433; Bruell 1974: 16).  
In addition to the appeal to universal human nature, the envoys argued that the Athenians 
deserved the empire because of their own particular merits. The Athenians had shown 
historical merits in fighting against the Persians, while they sacrificed themselves by 
abandoning the city and acting for the common good of the entire Greek populace. Although 
the envoys could not hide the oppressive character of the empire by referring to the doctrine 
of the natural right of the stronger to dominate the weaker (Thuc.1.76.2; 77.3; cf. 4.61.5; 5.89, 
105),13 the envoys’ final claim was that the rule of the Athenian Empire was in the best 
interest of its subjects. It was not really deception, to say that the Athenian Empire had 
positive aspects that bestowed benefits upon the ruled. In fact, Athenian rule was less 
oppressive in comparison to Spartan or, needless to say, to Persian rule. In addition, the 
conditions prevailing in the Aegean Sea required governance, since the Sea was controlled 
by pirates and stasis raged; wars, raids, and the conquest of cities were common. Above all, 
the Athenian Empire allowed the freest constitution to subject cities and allies. According to 
the envoys, the Athenian Empire gave the guarantee of both external and internal freedom to 
cities under its rule. Thus, the envoys’ speech attempted to refute the long-standing 
accusation that Athens was a tyrant-city. 
It is notable that the Athenian justification of the empire cited not only material 
necessities — such as profits and protection from foreign threats — but loftier elements, such 
as honor, the Athenians’ merits as a ruler, and even the interests of the ruled.14 They were 
                                                          
10 A lot of debates on the three distinctive motives of empire, especially on honor (ex. Meiggs 1972). 
Compare Thucydides’ three motives with Hobbes’ three well-known instincts in the state of nature: 
distrust, competition, and interest. Johnson demonstrates the nuanced difference of the two authors in 
spite of superficial similarity (Johnson 1993). 
11 Forde notes that the fear here is not objective but rather subjective, which implies that human beings 
are not automations lacking autonomy (cf. Ahrensdorf 1997: 243).   
12 Compare the previous list of motives (fear, honor, self-interest: Thuc.1.75) with this new order here 
(honor, fear, and self-interest: Thuc.1.76). Later, in Pericles’ last speech, only fear and honor appear 
as the primary concerns (Thuc.2.60–64). See De Romilly (1963: 251–54) and Finley (1987). For the 
aspect of economic self-interest, see Meiggs (1972: 255–72); Finley (1978); Finley (1982: 41–61); 
Lisa Kallet-Marx (1993).  
13 For the doctrine’s relationship with Sophistic thought, see Guthrie (1971: 55ff); Kerferd (1981: 
chap.10). However, the view that the strongest member of a group or symmachy is entitled to 
leadership was older (e.g., Hdt. 7.160.2, 161.3; Iliad 2.576–80).  
14 For the concept of necessity see Ostwald (1988) and for three elements of human things see Slomp 
(1990).  




able to justify the empire not only in terms of a sheer realist thesis, but also according to non-
realist elements. Moreover, the speech was given by anonymous envoys, which implies that 
most Athenians at that time had convinced themselves that they deserved the empire, due to 
both nature (phusis) and laws (nomoi). How was it possible that most Athenians dared to 
justify their empire with respect to both nature and laws? In other words, how was it possible 
that they were blind to the apparent contradiction that non-Athenians may have recognized 
easily? We find the answer in Pericles’ funeral oration, which succeeded in enchanting most 
Athenians to view their empire as being contradiction-free. Pericles’ funeral oration 
substantiated how the Athenians saw the perfect harmony between democracy and empire. 
First, Pericles’ oration displays the rudimentary relationship between the habits of the 
Athenians and the activities inherent in their political institutions. Athenians were unique in 
the Greek world; their uniqueness did not rest on their material wealth or monuments, but on 
peculiar qualities of habit and intellect. Specifically, Pericles emphasizes that the unity of 
deliberation and action was made possible by Athens’ settled habits, democratic political 
institutions, and national character. Thus, Pericles asserts that the power of Athens was based 
on the Athenian national character, namely Athenian democracy (Thuc.2.37). According to 
Pericles, Athenian democracy provided each citizen with the opportunity to participate in 
public life, debate, and deliberation, so that it produced a unity of will among its citizens that 
was far stronger than the Spartan one, which originated from blind obedience to the state. 
Pericles contrasts the bravery of the Spartans that resulted from painful discipline with the 
self-conscious patriotism of Athenian citizens, who were able to live as they pleased and yet 
be just as ready to act bravely when they must (Thuc.2.39). In this way, Pericles employed 
beautiful words to praise democracy. 
When he talks about their empire, however, Pericles appears to be frank and even blunt in 
saying that the empire was inevitably tyrannical. By noting that losing the empire would 
make its people unsafe (Thuc.2.64), Pericles acknowledges that the empire was inevitably 
tyrannical. Those who have regarded Pericles as a leader of moderation and prudence may be 
surprised by this outspoken statement of imperialism; however, it is notable that even the 
moderate Pericles could not conceal the inherently tyrannical nature of the empire. What he 
could do was enchant Athenians into believing that the democratic empire countered the 
tyrannical effect inherent in an empire, by virtue of its democratic character.  
The method that Pericles chose for enchanting the Athenians was overstating the 
democratic virtues of the Athenians. First, Pericles depends roughly on the Aristotelian thesis, 
that the good of individuals is closely connected to the good of their city. Pericles praises the 
Athenians for their active political life; thus, Pericles urges that the good of each individual 
citizen depends on the city, and in turn the Athenian city depends on the existence of the 
empire. Yet, Pericles makes a more specific point in relating freedom of Athenian political 
life to the practice of empire. He says: “You should not believe that you are struggling only 
over the one evil of slavery instead of freedom. You are also struggling over the loss of 
empire and the danger of the hatred that you have incurred from your rule. From this empire 
it is no longer possible for you to stand away ... for you now hold the empire as a tyranny, 
which seems to be unjust to have taken, but is now dangerous to give up” (Thuc.2.63). 
Pericles here makes an explicit causal linkage between freedom and empire (Raaflaub 2004: 
184-190), and succeeds in convincing Athenians that their freedom was dependent on 
Athens’ status as an imperial city.  
If Pericles succeeded in enchanting the whole Athenians — in other words, if the 
democratic empire appeared to Athenians to be well justified — then can we say that 
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Pericles’ rhetoric of democratic empire was indispensable for Athenian freedom? An 
imperialist may well answer “yes.” However, the Athenian demos may have stopped to 
think: “For whom should the democratic empire be maintained?” As the war went on, the 
Athenian demos experienced a number of crucial occasions, because of which it may have 
reconsidered the prevalent ideology of the democratic empire. Through these occasions, it 
began to awaken from Pericles’ enchantment. The most conspicuous test occurred in dealing 
with the Mytilenean revolt, which I will examine in the next section.   
 
 
4. DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE IN THE 
MYTILENEAN DEBATES 
 
“After Pericles’ death,” Thucydides writes, the leadership of Athens fell into the hands of 
men who chose to “occupy themselves with private cabals for leadership of the commons, by 
which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at 
home” (Thuc.2.65). Noting Thucydides’ evaluation of Pericles, many scholars attribute the 
downfall of the Athenian Empire to the lack of political leadership that Pericles showed in 
convincing the Athenians that the private interests of the Athenian demos was perfectly 
harmonious with the flourishing of the empire. True, Pericles succeeded in making Athenian 
demos “virtuous,”15 at least in terms of making them believe that the common good of the 
empire superseded private interests. As seen above, Pericles was able to enchant Athenian 
demos for a while with his eloquent words and exemplary deeds, so that it was blind to the 
contradiction inherent in the concept and term of “democratic empire.” However, Pericles 
did not remove the root of the disease of the democratic empire, which finally led it to self-
destruction. That disease did not immediately rise to the surface; instead, rather fortunately 
or unfortunately, the Athenian demos tended to become disenchanted from the Periclean 
spell of the democratic empire. Let me elaborate on how the Athenian demos acted 
differently after this disenchantment. The first test occurred in the way the Athenian demos 
dealt with the revolt of Mytilene.  
Just after Athens was smitten by the plague, the city of Mytilene revolted from the 
Athenian Empire (Thuc.3.2-5). The revolt was enormously distressing to Athenians, because 
the city had remained autonomous and enjoyed equality with Athens. After placing the city 
of Mytilene under siege, the Athenians decided to kill the entire male population and sell the 
women and children into slavery. The Athenians dispatched their admiral, Paches, to carry 
out this order.  
It is important to note that the Athenians “felt a kind of repentance in themselves and 
began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was that not the authors only but the whole 
city should be destroyed” (Thuc.3.36; cf. Orwin 1984: 485-94). This repentance implies that 
the Athenians were already waking from Pericles’ spell; had they been fully enchanted by 
Pericles’ ideology vis-à-vis the democratic empire, they would not have had even a second 
thought about Mytilene’s fate. The demos would have followed whatever policy Pericles had 
considered most compatible with the benefit of the empire, since no one knew the exact 
results of foreign policies. Had the Athenian demos been under Pericles’ leadership, it would 
not have cared about the precarious outcome, but rather about the unity of the empire. Above 
                                                          
15 In the Gorgias, however, Socrates refutes the view that the demos of Pericles’ age was virtuous in 
any sense (Plat. 515e-516d ).  




all, it was unusual for the Athenians even to reconsider the first decision they had made in 
the assembly. Even more remarkable was that the Athenian demos offered humanitarian 
reasons for rethinking its initial slaughter/slavery strategy, notwithstanding the expected 
danger that the Athenian demos may have become disunited on the matter of foreign policy. 
Again, had there been leaders like Pericles, Athens would have remained uniform and 
maintained its empire status longer; however, it would not have flourished forever, because it 
likely would have eventually declined for other reasons. No empire lasts forever, after all. 
The collapse of Athens was due to its internal schism, rather than external elements. Is this 
case more deplorable? The answer may differ according to perspectives; however, if we read 
closely the Mytilenean debates, one thing becomes clear: the Athenian demos was well 
aware that its split opinions on foreign policies undermined the common good of its empire, 
yet it showed an unequivocal preference for democracy over empire. In other words, it was 
not willing to sacrifice the cause of democracy to that of empire. Let me elaborate more on 
the demos’ conscious decision on that preference, by looking closer at the famous 
Mytilenean debates.  
Cleon’s speech was basically designed to persuade Athenians to carry out the sentence 
that they had decided upon the previous day. Cleon opened his speech with the sarcastic 
observation that the democratic atmosphere in Athens did not allow people to face up to the 
reality of the empire. Cleon reiterated Pericles’ earlier acknowledgement that the Athenian 
Empire was necessarily tyrannical to the ruled. What distinguished Cleon from Pericles was 
Cleon’s outspoken point that democracy was responsible for the mismanagement of empire. 
In other words, Cleon was the first Athenian leader to admit that democracy was not 
compatible with empire; he complained that the Athenians had gone astray in foreign affairs, 
because they lived lives of “security and openness” in democratic Athens (Thuc.3.37).  
More remarkably, Cleon’s criticism of democracy was leveled not only against 
unarticulated foreign policies but also against the democratic way of life itself. In Cleon’s 
mind, the failure of imperial foreign policies provided enough reason to condemn democracy 
as a whole. Cleon’s primary concern was with the success of the empire. Remember that 
Pericles was also concerned about the successful foreign policies of the empire, but he 
emphasized that its success was supported only by praising the democratic way of life among 
the Athenian demos (Thuc.2.65). However, by putting the interest of the empire before the 
value of democracy, Cleon disregard the demos’ preference — a preference that Pericles 
understood and exploited in his rhetoric of democratic empire.  
In addition, while Pericles’ version of Athenian imperialism celebrated the glory of 
Athens and her empire, Cleon’s view of the Athenian Empire was characterized simply by its 
harshness towards its subjects and was guided by expediency and interest alone. Pericles was 
not ignorant to the brute realities of imperialism; nonetheless, he made efforts to beautify the 
Athenian Empire, as if there were something nobler than fear and profit within the empire. 
From this perspective, Pericles proudly declared that Athens “is an education to Greece” 
(Thuc.2.41). According to Cleon, however, even the obedience that Athens’ allies paid was 
not due to a sense of friendship or goodwill, but rather because of Athens’ brute force 
(Thuc.3.37). Even if that were true, Cleon did not understand the situation he faced, and as a 
result, he failed to satisfy the Athenian demos. Even worse, Cleon did not show any 
willingness to please the demos. Ironically, the Athenian demos wanted to hear even 
specious praises of democracy and its democratic way of life; it needed someone who could 
beautify its empire and thus make it worthy of its individual sacrifices. Although Cleon later 
attempted to ennoble Athenian foreign policy by appealing to punitive justice — that is to 
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say, that the Mytileneans should be punished because they had wronged the Athenians’ trust 
— his amendment to the vulgarization of the Athenian Empire was “too little, too late” in 
convincing the Athenian demos. His reluctance to please the demos was the decisive reason 
why the majority of Athenian demos opposed Cleon in the end.  
In contrast, Diodotus surely attempted to appease the demos. He opened his speech by 
expressing how he understood Athenian democracy. He was aware of speakers’ reputations, 
so the perceived purity of his motives were more important than the substantive contents of 
his speeches to the demos. Trust in the motives of the political leaders would be crucial to 
the proper functioning of democracy, and Diodotus realized exactly that it was the Athenian 
demos’ trust he had to gain, in order to be persuasive. Thus, he repeatedly emphasized that 
he had had sufficient loyalty to democratic institutions.  
Yet, in following part of his speech, it becomes clear that Diodotus seemingly 
undermines the previous argumentation for his democratic loyalty, by stating that “he that 
gives the soundest advice is forced by lying to get himself believed” (Thuc.3.43). How did 
he dare to say that he may have told a lie to the demos, even while in front of them? If we 
look more closely at the specific context of Diodotus’ speech, we can understand that this 
seemingly undemocratic statement was made because of Diodotus’ rational calculation.16 
The apparent situation was that the Athenian demos had reassembled to reconsider its first 
decision of the previous day on the Mytilenean revolt, mainly because the decision seemed 
“savage” (Thuc.3.37-40). Perhaps the opinions of the demos had been divided, but only 
marginally. Following Cleon’s speech, Diodotus spoke to represent those who opposed the 
“savage” decision; it was anticipated that he would argue that they needed a more lenient 
policy in dealing with the Mytileneans. So when Diodotus implies that he may lie to the 
demos, it was as if he were whispering to his existing supporters, “Don’t be offended, even if 
my speech appears to be savage. That’s just a lie for the purpose of convincing the 
previously pro-Cleon audience.”  
Diodotus seems to be even-handed and fabricate his speech as if he were interested only 
in the expediency of the empire. Thus, he argues that the important thing is not what the 
Mytileneans deserve in terms of punishment — which was Cleon’s focus — but rather what 
is in the interest of Athens. Furthermore, he rebuffs Cleon’s point that justice and self-
interest could be combined; he holds that these “can never possibly be found together in the 
same thing” (Thuc.3.47). Cleon’s argument appears to be based at least partially on justice, 
whereas Diodotus excluded justice altogether from the treatment of the Mytilenean revolt. 
This part of Diodotus’ speech may have disappointed the previous pro-Diodotus people, 
because it seemed to represent a more ruthless version of realism than Cleon’s. Nonetheless, 
one may be reminded of Diodotus’ excuse, that sometimes it is necessary to tell a lie for the 
sake of persuasion. Therefore, Diodotus’ speech was different from what it appeared to be on 
the surface — taking the argument of expediency a step further by apparently rejecting all 
claims of justice, in order to gain the trust of the Athenian demos. In any case, Diodotus 
managed to put forward the argument for the preservation of the Mytilenean population, and 
appeal to the Athenians’ sense of justice by saying that since the majority of Mytileneans had 
not committed a crime, it would be unjust for the Athenians to execute them (Thuc.3.47).17  
                                                          
16 Relying on this statement Johnson argues that Diodotus does not believe in the realism that he argues 
for (Johnson 1993:138).   
17 Specifically, Diodotus argues that it is not in the Athenians’ interest to kill all of them, oligarchs and 
democrats alike. Orwin, Bolotin and Bruell appreciate this view of Diodotus (Orwin 1994: 112-3; 




Finally, Diodotus won the support of the assembly. Yet, one can hardly say that it was 
because his substantial arguments were superior to those of Cleon. Cleon’s key claim was 
based on the theory of deterrence — that deterrence was a primary means of running an 
empire — whereas Diodotus’ claim was with regards to appeasement, and that indiscriminate 
punishment would result in other desperate revolts. As international relations theorists may 
agree, both the theories are valid, at least in theory: the theories are warranted only by their 
practical application. Similarly, both Diodotus’ and Cleon’s claims were equally acceptable 
without knowing exactly the results of practical application of the theories. Thus, what 
affected significantly the decision of the Athenian demos were not the specific contents of 
the speeches, but its preexisting preference for democracy. Diodotus shows full trust of 
democratic institutions and never dismisses the demos’ opinions. The seemingly awkward 
revelation of the possibility of deceiving the demos was a deliberate and calculated 
confession that he knew democratic power ruled in every sphere within the polis. The 
Athenian demos must have appreciated Diodotus’ democratic bent; even if the demos was 
divided in its opinions, and sometimes made use of elites to refute its opponents, it would 
never tolerate elites’ criticism of democracy as such. Diodotus observed the democratic 
principle of the Athenian Empire, whereas Cleon inadvertently overstepped those boundaries 
by criticizing the democratic way of life in front of the demos. 
Therefore, Athenians’ preference for Diodotus’ policy proved that they consciously 
preferred democratic principles over imperial ones, were they forced to choose one. In the 
next section, we will see more clearly that the Athenian demos was determined to choose 
democracy rather than empire, whenever the two principles collided. 
 
 
5. IMPLOSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE IN THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 
 
I argued in the previous sections that the fate of the democratic empire had already been 
anticipated, beginning with the earlier Athenian Empire, through the height of the Periclean 
empire, to splitting the empire during the treatment of the Mytilenean revolt. However, it is 
often argued that the Sicilian expedition was the decisive “moment of truth” that led to the 
abrupt decline of the Athenian Empire. I agree with the existing view that the Sicilian 
expedition was the watershed moment in the downfall of the Athenian Empire; however, I 
object, inasmuch as the problem was not in the decision vis-à-vis the expedition itself, but in 
the way the expedition was managed. The Sicilian expedition failed primarily because the 
demos recalled the most capable general Alcibiades and instead appointed the too-inactive 
Nicias (Ahrendsdorf 1997: 256). I argue that the Athenian demos made the decision 
consciously because it made the maintenance of democracy a priority, even before making 
guaranteed gains through imperial expedition. Thus, the failure of the Sicilian expedition was 
an exemplary case of the Athenians consciously choosing democracy over imperialism. Let 
us now review, from the beginning, how the disenchanted Athenian demos dealt with the 
Sicilian expedition. 
In the spring of the 17th year of the war, an assembly was held in which it was decided to 
send 60 ships to Sicily, under the absolute command of Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus 
(Thuc.6.8). The Athenians were to aid the people of Egesta against the Selinuntians, to 
reestablish the Leontines if they had time, and to order the affairs of Sicily in accordance 
                                                          
Bolotin 1987: 27-32; Bruell 1974: 16-17; cf. Connor 1984: 84-91).   
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with Athenian interests. Five days later, the Athenians again assembled to consider how to 
ready the fleet quickly and to discuss further those things the generals would need for the 
expedition. Nicias came forward, willing to speak against the Sicilian expedition, which he 
believed was an attempt, under minute and superficial pretenses, to conquer all of Sicily 
(Thuc.6.8). 
Certainly, Nicias realized that the Athenians could not be restrained, at this point, from 
“wanting more” (pleonexia). Thus, he attempted to show the Athenians that it was the wrong 
time to attempt a conquest and that Sicily would not be easy to conquer. In his speech, he 
warned the Athenians that by undertaking the Sicilian expedition, they would leave many 
enemies behind them and make many more enemies, and that the treaty they had with the 
Spartans (Thuc.5.23-24) was a firm one (Thuc.6.10). In addition, he said that the Athenians 
still had problems with their present empire, including a revolt from Chalcidea in Thrace and 
doubtful obedience from others. With regard to Sicily, it would be difficult for the Athenians 
to retain obedience, because it was far from Athens; if Athens failed the conquest, it would 
lose forever the means of attempting another conquest. Nicias warned the Athenians about 
launching a new expedition or conquest before concluding their war with the Spartans. The 
policy that Nicias advocated was a very cautious one: He did not want to risk anything at this 
point in the war, or at least not any new ventures. In a certain sense, Nicias tried to take 
Pericles’ tack, not simply in terms of following Pericles’ advice to avoid two front lines of 
battle, but in trying to enchant the Athenian demos by assimilating private interests with the 
common good of the empire. He failed, however, because the Athenian demos by that time 
was different from what had been under Pericles’ leadership. They were now disenchanted, 
especially by the experience of the Mytilenean debate.  
Compared to the pious and cautious Nicias, Alcibiades embodied the excessive desires of 
the Athenians. Alcibiades had been perpetually demanding more for both himself and his 
city. Scornfully rejecting Nicias’ “do nothing” policy, Alcibiades claimed in his speech that 
if Athens failed to undertake fresh conquests in Sicily, it would “wear itself out and its skill 
in everything would decay” (Thuc.6.18). The principle on which Alcibiades based his call to 
invade Sicily was qualitatively different from that upon which the Athenian Empire was 
justified previously. This new undertaking had not been explained in its own terms, but as an 
answer to the demands of a purely external necessity, i.e. the excessive desires of the 
Athenians. 
The traditional reading of the Sicilian expedition is that it was an exemplar of misconduct 
within a democratic institution, where the irrational motivation of the Athenian demos 
matched the excessive desires of Alcibiades. Thucydides earlier admonished such desires, 
saying that the ultimate cause of Athens’ defeat was the breakdown of its democratic 
institution, the “private cabals for leadership of the commons” caused by the growth of 
factionalism, “which not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil 
discord at home” (Thuc.2.65). He also points out in the same section that Athenians did not 
“succumb till they fell victims of their own intestine disorders” (Thuc.2.65). By underscoring 
these passages, the dominant reading of the Sicilian expedition concludes that these disorders 
caused Athenians to abandon Pericles’ policy of prudent restraint and to mismanage the 
Sicilian campaign by recalling Alcibiades and putting Nicias in charge of it; these matters, it 
is popularly believed, led to Athens’ eventual defeat (Doyle 1991: 181; Garst 1989: 18; 
Bagby 1994: 139-40; cf. Palmer 1982: 38-41).  
In contrast with the dominant reading, my interpretation is that the failure of the Sicilian 
expedition was not due to the excessive desires of the demos but to the demos’ fear of 




tyranny. Let me elaborate more on this point.  
It should be noted that the Athenians came very close to achieving victory in Sicily, and 
yet were defeated only after Alcibiades was expelled from Athens and managed to convince 
the Spartans to come to the aid of Syracuse (Thuc.6.15. cf. Thuc.8.63-98; cf. Ahrendorf 
1997: 256-7). In addition, it was pious Nicias that brought total disaster to the Athenians. 
Nicias decided to delay their withdrawal from Sicily because of omen from the gods, an 
eclipse of the moon.18 This decision allowed the enemies to destroy the entire Athenian army 
(Thuc.7.50). Thus, one can conclude that the concurrence of the Athenian demos’ desire and 
Alcibiades’ ambition may have worked toward success — at least, avoided total disaster — 
in the Sicilian expedition, had the demos not removed Alcibiades from his position. 
This conclusion can be supported by Thucydides’ comments, which were inserted 
between Nicias’ first speech and the following Alcibiades’ speech. In this place, one would 
rightly expect a criticism of both Alcibiades’ and Athens’ ambitions. Instead, Thucydides 
here implies that the cause of Alcibiades’ recall — and therefore Athens’ downfall — was 
not ambition, passion, or expense, but the suspicion aroused in the demos vis-à-vis his 
unconventional lifestyle. Thucydides does not take advantage of a perfect opportunity to give 
an oral lesson on the errors of Alcibiades’ ambition and the excessive desires of the Athenian 
demos; instead, he implies that Alcibiades’ ambition and the expansion of the empire were 
both sustainable (Riley 2000: 143). Notably, it was not the abandonment of virtue, but, at 
least in this case, the retention of democratic virtue that accused Alcibiades. It was again the 
demos’ taste for democracy that removed Alcibiades from the position of commander and 
consequently brought about the downfall of the empire. The demos’ fear of tyranny was 
understandable, as they had observed opportunities for influence, power, and enrichment that 
had been given to elite leaders. Such fear was further enhanced by the ever more ruthlessly 
demonstrated ambition and thirst for power demonstrated by some younger members of the 
elite, like Alcibiades (Connor 1984: 164-65; 179-80; 177).  
If we look at the story of how the Athenian demos recalled Alcibiades, Thucydides’ 
implication becomes clearer. Thucydides describes how, during preparations for sailing, the 
Hermae were defaced — a sacrilege, in the minds of the Athenian demos (Thuc.6.27-9). 
Somehow, Alcibiades was blamed for this offense. He asked for a trial immediately to purge 
himself of suspicion; he declared that if he were found to be guilty, he would be put to death. 
However, his enemies were too afraid of the trial, given that the army was still under 
Alcibiades’ influence. They decided — and Alcibiades agreed — to permit him to sail with 
the army; they would deal with the charges later. After that, the inextricable fear again 
occupied the demos and prompted it to remove Alcibiades from the command at the first 
possible moment. That was an irrational decision, with respect to the success of the Sicilian 
expedition; however, one must consider whether it was still irrational with respect to the 
interests of the demos.  
Thucydides again presents good criteria by which we can assess the demos’ rationality. 
When addressing the recall of Alcibiades, Thucydides inserts a strange yet famous digression, 
wherein he tells the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton and their involvement in the 
Athenian tyrannicide. One would expect here that Thucydides would use the story to accuse 
Alcibiades of tyranny and criticize Athens’ erotic, imperial designs (Seager 1967; Stewart 
1965). However, he does not. Instead, Thucydides mentions that the demos misunderstood 
                                                          
18 For the close relationship between Athenian imperialism and piety issue, see Strauss (1964: 229); 
Orwin (1994: ch.4) ;  Grene (1965: 83-92).  
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the most famous event in its own history, the Athenian tyrannicide. It was not at all the tyrant, 
Hippias, but his brother, Hipparchus, who was killed (cf. Thuc.1.20). Thucydides implies 
here that the Athenian demos’ misplaced piety resulted in Alcibiades’ undue recall (Palmer 
1982: 103-24). If there were problems with the Athenian demos, it would not have been so 
much its excessive ambitions as its preference for democracy — an adamant attachment to 
piety, in this case. 
Thus, it seems that the fate of a democratic empire was doomed not because of its 
excessive ambition, but because of its misplaced attention to the virtue of democracy. This 
ambivalent and ambiguous tendency of democracy was obvious, even in the early stages of 
the Athenian Empire. However, we must note that the Athenian demos was never equivocal 
in maintaining the priority of democracy through the rise and fall of the empire. In the 
Sicilian expedition, the Athenian demos paid unexpected attention to piety in dealing with 
Alcibiades, for no other reason than they doubted Alcibiades’ loyalty to democracy.19 Even if 
the demos knew that Alcibiades was the most capable general for the Sicilian expedition, its 
preference for democratic principles canceled out any expediency claim of empire. In short, 
the failure of the Sicilian expedition was due to the demos’ adamant adherence to democracy. 
The demos was fully aware of what it was doing.   
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: FATE OF DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE AND THUCYDIDES’ 
INSTRUCTION 
 
This paper does not deny the existing view that the Athenian Empire perished because of 
the existence of the demos. True, the Athenian demos was responsible for the demise of the 
Athenian Empire. However, it was not simply because it could not restrain excessive desires; 
rather, it was because it maintained democratic dispositions that characterized it as having 
multifarious, sometimes ambivalent, and unpredictable desires. Remember that Plato in The 
Republic describes the demos as having two discernible characteristics: It is easily inclined to 
desire excessively but, at the same time, it jumps from one desire to another. One day, it 
would seek money; on another, they pursued even philosophy (Plat. Republic Book 8, 
esp.561c-d). Likewise, the Athenian demos in the rise and fall of the Athenian Empire 
showed multifarious desires. It desired to be free, to be prosperous, and even to be honored 
by others. However, the desires of the Athenian demos were never so excessive as to invite 
tyranny within. In other words, the Athenian demos remained persistently democratic, while 
resisting any sacrifice of democratic values. 20  Evidently the Athenian demos did not 
reconcile democratic principles with the expediency of empire.  
This paper argues that the Athenian Empire perished because the Athenian demos 
adhered to its democratic character persistently. Again, democracy was responsible for the 
downfall of the empire and, to this extent, the fate of the democratic empire was anticipated. 
Was democracy culpable, because of its decisive contribution to the downfall of empire? 
Was the Athenian demos thus irrational in sacrificing the empire to democratic principles? 
                                                          
19 As Connor points out, it is ironical that “Athens comes very much to resemble Melos, forced to rely 
on hope, chance, and speculation about the gods” (Connor 1984: 155).  
20 By “democratic” I mean literal democracy, rule of demos in the ancient context instead of normative 
goal of politics in the modern context. For the literal meaning of democracy in the ancient context see 
Ober (1989).     




The Athenian demos accepted the idea of a democratic empire when it chose the most 
important democratic value, i.e., freedom (eleutheria), and it was willing to be enchanted by 
Pericles’ ideology of the democratic empire, when its democratic values were praised in the 
name of democratic virtue. However, it was disenchanted no sooner than it saw superficial 
and minor conflicts between “democracy” and “empire.” Finally, they disregarded the 
principle of empire when they saw even the slight possibility that the latter could undermine 
democratic principles, as shown in the case of Alcibiades’ recall. With their defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War, the Athenian Empire disappeared; however, Athenian democracy lasted 
long afterward. Was the Athenian demos still irrational, then? One could say that the 
Athenian demos was running its empire irrationally. One could hardly say, however, that it 
was running its democracy irrationally. 
Having said that, what are Thucydides’ instructions vis-à-vis the democratic empire? We 
are left with what seem to be ambivalent messages for different audiences. To democrats, he 
left the instruction that they may have to give up their empire at some point, because a 
“democratic empire” is self-contradictory at its core. For instance, if American people intend 
an empire to survive, they must be ready to sacrifice democratic principles — but if that be 
the case, they could not claim to be any more democratic than the Athenian demos. At best, 
they may live under the rule of one man while being enchanted by the rhetoric of a 
democratic empire, as was the case with Pericles’ empire. On the other hand, Thucydides 
leaves another instruction to democratic imperialists like top elites of American foreign 
policies. He implies that they should pay special attention to democratic virtues, as Pericles 
did. Democratic virtues are, at best, precarious, yet the elites should beautify their empire, 
making all efforts possible to justify their empire with rhetoric. This does not suggest that the 
top elites create propaganda to facilitate imperial foreign policies but rather that they  
provide democratic people with legitimate rhetoric that aligns imperial foreign policies with 
democratic lives. As soon as they neglect rhetorical justification of an empire and turn to 
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